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ABSTRACT
This paper models an economy in which risk-averse savers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs make
investment decisions. Aggregate investment in high-yielding risky projects is maximized when
risk-neutral agents bear all nondiversifiable risks. A role ofbanks is to assume nondiversifiable
risks by pledging their capital in addition to diversifying risks. Banks, however, do not
completely eliminate risks when monitoring by depositors is not perfect. Government deposit
insurance that uses taxrevenue to pay off depositors effectively remaining risks to entrepreneurs.
Deposit insurance improves welfare because imperfect monitoringby the government results in
income transfer among risk-neutral agents rather than lowerproduction.
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The banking business in a traditional sense may be characterized by risky
lending, deposit contracts offering fixed terms, implicit or explicit deposit
insurance provided by the government, and relatively tight government regulation.
This paper shows that these banking arrangements help to increase aggregate
investment by effectively transferring nondiversifiable risks from risk-averse
savers to risk-neutral entrepreneurs and bankers.
A traditional belief is that the value of banking derives from cost
efficiency in financial intermediation. Kindleberger (1984, p.45) lists three
aspects of financial intermediation: borrowing at retail and lending at
wholesale, lending long and borrowing short, and diversification of risks. He
states, “Market making, credit stretching, and risk minimization are threads that
run throughout financial history.” Traditionally, banks carried out these
functions at relatively low costs.
Recent studies emphasize the banks’ ability to resolve information
problems. Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Jacklin (1987) show that
demand deposit contracts enable individuals effectively to share uninsurable
liquidity risk. According to them, liquidity needs of individuals are
unobservable to the market and, hence, cannot be insured in a normal manner.
While these studies focus on information on depositors, some other studies
emphasize information on borrowers [e.g., Chan (1983), Diamond (1984),
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Boyd and Prescott (1986)]. They argue that
financial intermediation reduces monitoring costs arising from information
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Information on bankers has also been
considered. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) rationalize demandable debt, a key feature
of traditional banking, as a means to discipline bankers when information is
1incomplete.
These arguments apply to financial intermediaries in general, rather than
banks in particular. Increasing sophistication of financial markets has reduced
the costs of both transaction services and information production. As a result,
there are many financial instruments that can substitute for bank deposits and
loans.’ For example, money market mutual fund shares offer transaction services
and liquidity. Stock and bond mutual funds channel savers’ money to investment
projects and diversify risks at low costs. Established corporations, which are
subject to less information asymmetry in general, often reduce their reliance on
bank loans by issuing commercial paper. These developments pose questions about
the uniqueness of banks and the needs for government intervention, including
deposit insurance. For example, if some run-free financial instruments such as
money market shares can provide liquidity and payment services as efficiently as
banks, deposit insurance as a mechanism to prevent bank runs is not justified.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) suggest the creation of a riskless transactions
medium as a rationale for banks and deposit insurance. According to them, the
creation of riskless securities prevents agents with superior information from
taking advantage of uninformed “liquidity traders.” This argument does not
consider the banks’ role of lending to risky borrowers. Thus, they recognize
that the same role can be performed by money market mutual funds holding risk-
free securities such as Treasury bills.
This paper focuses on the allocation of nondiversifiable risks.
‘Haubrich and King (1990) show that demand deposits uniquely contribute as
insurance against private contingencies only when other markets are restricted.
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) also question the necessity of demand deposits as a
monitoring mechanism in modern financial markets.
2Apparently, some risks cannot be diversified and hence, must be born by
someone.2 A main assumption is that savers are more risk averse than
entrepreneurs and bankers.3 In this case, it is desirable to have entrepreneurs
and bankers bear all nondiversifiable risks. This paper shows that bank deposits
are superior to other financial instruments in channelling funds and transferring
nondiversifiable risks from risk-averse savers to risk-neutral agents.
In addition to diversifying risks, banks assume nondiversifiable risks by
pledging their capital. Since they can increase expected profits by holding
risky portfolios, banks will not completely eliminate risks when monitoring is
less than perfect. The government eliminates risks for depositors by providing
deposit insurance and regulating banks. In the event that banks fail due to
incomplete monitoring, the government taxes entrepreneurs to pay off depositors.
Deposit insurance, thus, effectively transfers risks from depositors to
entrepreneurs. The transfer of nondiversifiable risks results in a lower
equilibrium interest rate and a higher level of investment. The utility gains
of savers and entrepreneurs from increased investment depend on assumptions about
investment opportunities and market structure. Ex post redistribution through
taxation, however, unambiguously improves the ex ante utility of both savers and
entrepreneurs because aggregate production is higher with deposit insurance.
While inability of depositors to monitor banks lowers the level of production,
ineffective monitoring by banking authorities simply distorts the distribution
of income. Thus, deposit insurance can still improve welfare even if the
2Greenspan (1993) states, “Risk can be priced properly. But all risk cannot
be eliminated. Even more important, the willingness to take risk is essential
to the growth of the macroeconomy.”
3Kindleberger (1984, p.45) notes that financial intermediaries stand between
risky borrowers and risk-averse lenders.
3government is less effective than depositors in monitoring banks.
The next section models an economy in which savers and entrepreneurs
maximize their utility and shows the roles of banks and deposit insurance.
Conclusions follow the model.
2. The Model
This section analyzes the maximizing behavior of individuals with different
attitudes toward risk to show the effects of risk allocation on social welfare.
The analysis focuses on the roles of banks and government-backed deposit
insurance in reducing risks for depositors. The model shows that demand deposit
contracts insured by the government are an effective mechanism of transferring
nondiversifiable risks from risk-averse savers to risk-neutral agents. The
transfer of nondiversifiable risks increases investment and, hence, expected
production.
2.a. The structure of the economy
Individuals in this economy live two periods. No one dies early because
this model does not consider the liquidity need of individuals, which has been
well addressed by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Individuals are
classified into two types, savers and entrepreneurs. Savers are risk averse, and
entrepreneurs are risk neutral.
U~’(C)> 0 U~”(C)< 0
U9’(C) > 0, Ue”(C) 0
where C denotes consumption, and subscripts s and c stand for savers and
entrepreneurs.
Everybody is endowed with one unit of good and concerned only about
consumption in the second period. Goods can be either stored or invested in
production. While self-storage is available to everybody, only entrepreneurs
4have access to production technology. Any fraction of the good can be stored,
but investment is lumpy. Each production project requires X (X > 1) units of
investment. If an entrepreneur fails to attract enough capital (X - 1) from
savers, he/she has to rely on self-storage. Goods are identical for the
consumption purpose but different for the investment purpose. While goods owned
by savers can be used in all production projects, goods owned by entrepreneurs
are project-specific. Thus, entrepreneurs cannot invest in each other’s
projects.4 A rationale for this assumption may be that fixed investment was
already made in previous periods or that entrepreneurs own human capital. There
are large numbers of savers (n) and entrepreneurs (m). Thus, the capital market
is competitive.
The return on self-storage is 1 per unit with certainty. On the other
hand, production offers an expected return greater than or equal to 1, but it is
risky. Production can fail, and the failure probability depends on the state of
the economy. There are two possible states of the economy, good and bad. If the
good state occurs, the failure probability is zero. In the bad state, a
proportion, Pf~of investment projects fails, and each project is equally likely
to fail. Thus, Pf is the probability that an investment project fails in the bad
state. In this situation, investing in a large number of projects will diversify
the failure risk of individual projects. The risk of the bad state of the
economy, however, cannot be diversified.
The return from failed production is zero, and the return from succeeded
production varies across projects, The return from the jth project conditional
upon success:
4This assumption does not affect qualitative results as long as the goods
owned by entrepreneurs are not enough to utilize all profitable production
opportunities.
5R3 f(j) where j = 1, ---, m
~f/aj < 0
Production projects are indexed based on profitability, starting from the most
profitable project. The return decreases because of differing abilities or
opportunities of entrepreneurs. The expected return from the mth project:
Em(R) = Pbtr’fO + (l-Pf)~R~) + (l-Pb)•RTh = (1 - PbPf)Rm 1 (Al)
where ~b = the probability that the bad state occurs
Pf = the probability of bank failure in the bad state.
Thus, the mt~~ entrepreneur is indifferent between self-storage and production,
and all other entrepreneurs desire to undertake production projects.
In aggregate, there is balance between available resources and production
opportunities.
n+m=m•X (A2)
Thus, production opportunities are exhausted when everybody fully invests in
production.
2.b. Utility Maximization
Individuals make portfolio decisions in the first period to maximize the
expected utility from second-period consumption. The decisions of entrepreneurs,
who are risk neutral, are simple. They undertake production projects if the
expected return on their investment after paying off savers is greater than or
equal to 1, which is the opportunity cost of capital. The decision of the jt~~
entrepreneur is to undertake the production project if
E(R) = Pb•[Pf•°+ (l-Pf)•(R3•X - RE•(X~l))] + (l-Pb)~(R3~X - RE•(X_1))
= (1 - Pb•Pf)•{RJ•X - RE.(X - 1)) 1 (El)
where RE is the equilibrium return promised to savers.
In this economy, lenders do not need to monitor borrowers because borrowers self-
6select given the equilibrium borrowing cost. This simple structure is adopted
to narrow the focus of the paper.
Savers maximize the expected utility by choosing the optimum proportion of
their endowments to be invested in production. Assuming for a moment that each
individual lends to only one entrepreneur because of high transaction costs, the
expected utility of savers:
E(U5) = Pb•{Pf•U(l-O) + (1 - P~).U((l_8)+O.RE)]+ (1 -
= Pb•Pf•U(l-O) + (1 - Pb•Pf)•U((l-O)+9~} (E2)
where 0 is the proportion of endowments invested in production.
Since the capital market is competitive, individuals take RE as given.
3E(U~)/aO= Pb•Pf~(8U(CL)/8CL)~(-l) + (l~Pb.Pf).(aU(CH)/8CH).(RE~l)
where CL = (1 - 0), the amount of consumption when the low portfolio return is
realized.
C11
- ((l~0)+8.RE), the amount of consumption when the high portfolio return
is realized.
82E(TJ~)/8O2
= PbPf•(8U(CL)/ôCL)~(äCL/8O) + Pb•Pf•(8U(CL)/8CL)•(82CL/882)
+ (l-Pb.Pf).(02u(CH)/8CH2)•(aCH/ao)2
+ (l-Pb.Pf).(au(CH)/3C11).(a2CH/802)
= Pb•Pf•{82U(CL)/8CL2) + (l_Pb.Pf).{82u(CH)/3C11
2).(RE_l)2 0
since 321JS/8C2 < 0.
Thus, the marginal gain from shifting endowments from self-storage to investment
in production decreases as the portfolio share of investment increases. An
intuitive explanation for this result is as follows. A shift of endowments from
self-storage to investment results in an increase in C11 and a decrease in CL at
constant rates. Accordingly, the expected return on the portfolio increases at
a constant rate, and the gap between CL and CH increases with the portfolio share
7of investment. When the portfolio share of investment is high, therefore,
additional investment in production involves a sacrifice of stored goods in a
region where marginal utility is high and a gain from investment in a region
where marginal utility is low. Thus, the attractiveness of marginal investment
decreases with the portfolio share of investment.
This result suggests that there may exist an interior solution, i.e.,
8E(U~)/30 = 0 at 0* that is greater than zero but less than one. The optimum
proportion 0* cannot be one in this case because the expected return from the
marginal project when 0 = 1 is one per unit (by Al and A2), which is not
acceptable to risk-averse savers. Thus, an interior solution is guaranteed if
8E(U~)/a0> 0 when 0 = 0 and RE = R,°, where R,°is the return that satisfies the
zero profit condition for the most productive entrepreneur. In other words, the
return from the most profitable production project is high enough to induce risk-
averse savers to invest some of their endowments in the project. This condition
will be assumed to be satisfied throughout the remainder of this paper.
2.c. Equilibrium return on saving
The aggregate supply of funds is equal to the aggregate demand at the
equilibrium return, RE. The aggregate supply is the optimum proportion of
savers’ endowments invested in production multiplied by the number of savers
(n.0*(RE)). The proportion 0 is an increasing function of RE because 8E(U8)/80
is higher at every level of 0 when RE is higher.
(8E(U~)/30)/8RE= (l-Pb.Pf)~(OU(CH)/8CH}> 0
The aggregate demand for funds is the required borrowing per project
multiplied by the number of profitable projects (j(RE)•(X~l)).
From El, entrepreneur j undertake the production project if
R3 (1 + RE.(X - l)•(l - ~b~f)} / (1 -
8ORJ/8RE (X - l)•(l - ~b~f) / (1 - Pb•Pf)•X > 0
Thus, aj/8RE < 0. In words, the number of profitable projects is a decreasing
function of RE since only a small number of projects are profitable after making
large payment to savers.
The equilibrium condition is:
n.0*(RE) = j(RE).(X_l)
There exists the equilibrium return on saving RE that satisfies this condition
because this economy has a usual upward sloping supply curve and a downward
sloping demand curve. If we assume that R~-R~+1
= c, which is a very small
number, the equilibrium return is the one that satisfies the zero profit
condition for the marginal entrepreneur j’~. The marginal entrepreneur j~makes
no economic profit because of the threat that entrepreneur j*+l bids away saving.
2.d. Financial Intermediation
Now, let’s introduce another type of economic agents, banks. Bankers are
risk neutral and endowed with a technology to diversify risks at no cost and Y
units of goods each. These goods are identical to goods owned by other economic
agents for consumption and storage purposes, but cannot be used for production.5
Thus, their opportunity cost is 1 per unit. Under these assumptions, it is
costless for risk-neutral bankers to diversify risks and assume nondiversifiable
risks with their capital. If savers can observe the behavior of banks perfectly,
competition for risk-averse savers will force banks to offer risk-free deposits
by diversifying to the maximum extent and holding enough capital. The
diversification and transfer of risks lower the equilibrium return on saving and
increase aggregate investment in production.
5This assumption is made to simplify the condition of the aggregate supply
of funds.
9In this economy, banks can completely diversify the failure risks of
individual projects by lending the equal amount to all entrepreneurs undertaking
investment projects. Then there remains only the risk of the state of the
economy. The expected utility of savers with complete diversification becomes:
E(U5) = Pb [U( (l-0)+(l f)0R) + (l-Pb)•U((l-0)+0•R5) (E3)
In the bad state, a saver recovers (l~P~).0.RE from their investment 0 because
the proportion Pf of production projects fails.
3E(U~)/a0 = Pb(3U(CLD)/0CLD)((l~Pf)~RE~l) + (l~Pb).(3U(CH)/3CH).(RE~l)
where CLD denotes the amount of consumption when the low portfolio return with
diversification is realized, [(l~0)+(l~Pf).0.RE].
With the diversification of risks, 8E(U1)/80 becomes higher at every level of 0
for all RE 0.
[3E(U~)/80]D - {8E(U8)/80}~= Pb((l-Pf)’(R-l)(OU(CLD)/OCLD - 8U(C11)/3C11}
+ Pb.Pf.(ou(CL)/aCL - 8U(CLD)/OCLD) > 0
since CL < CLD < C11 and U5(C11)/8C11 < US(CLD)/OCLD <
where superscripts D and ND denote the cases of diversification and no
diversification.
Then 0* is higher at every level of RE when risks are diversified. In aggregate,
the supply curve becomes flatter when investment in production involve less
risks. Therefore, diversification leads to a lower RE and a higher level of
investment in production.
Banks assume nondiversifiable risks by pledging their capital in addition
to diversifying risks. Banks offer a fixed return to savers and absorb losses
with their capital if the bad state occurs. Bank capital K can absorb all losses
in the bad state if
K (RD - (l~Pf)•RE).D
10where RD is the contracted return on bank deposits.
When saving becomes risk-free, the expected utility of savers is:
E(U~) = U((l~0)+0.RD)
OE(U5)/a0 = (3U(C)/OC).(RD - 1)
Thus, 0 = 1 for RD 1. Then the competitive solutions are 0 = 1 and RD = 1
because the supply of deposits is infinitely elastic at RD = 1.
In a competitive market, banks make zero economic profit. Thus, the
expected return on investment becomes equal to the expected return on deposits.
E(RD) = (l_Pb.Pf)•RE = E(RE) (E4)
When E(RD) = E(RE) =1, all available production projects are utilized because
E(R~) = 1 by Al. Thus, the diversification and transfer of risks result in a
lower equilibrium return on saving and a higher level of investment.
2.e. Monitoring of banks
If depositors fail to monitor banks perfectly, banks can increase the
“option value,” an expected profit arising from limited liability, by
diversifying less and/or reducing the capital ratio. This moral hazard problem
is widely recognized (e.g., Merton (1977), Marcus (1984), and Keeley (1990)).
Depositors need to observe asset portfolios and capital ratios to monitor banks
to assure the solvency of banks. For analytical convenience, let’s assume that
depositors observe asset portfolios accurately but observe capital ratios with
noise.6 Thus, banks diversify perfectly but attempt to reduce capital ratios.
6Qualitative results are similar when depositors observe asset portfolios,
instead of capital ratios, with noise or observe both variables with noise. The
option value of banks arises from the possibility of negative net worth. Banks
in this model can increase the expected negative worth, while preserving the
expected return on assets, by diversifying less and/or holding less capital.
Thus, it is sufficient to consider one of the two variables. Since the
distribution of return on assets changes with the degree of diversification, the
analysis becomes unnecessarily complicated when the degree of diversification is
allowed to vary.
11The expected profit of a bank is:
- RD)•D + (l_Pb).(RE_RD).D if K (RD_(l_PfY.RE)*D
E(ir) = (ES)
Pb•(-K) + (l~Pb)•(RE~RD)•D if K<(Rt~~(l~Pf).RE).D
When E(RD) is perceived to be RD, RD = (l~Pb.Pf).RE from E4. Substituting (1-
Pb~f)/p~D for RE,
0i f K (RD~(l~P1).RE}.D
E(ir) = (E6)
(l-a)•Pb•(l - (l_Pf).(l_Pb.Pf)).RD.D > 0 if K < (RD_(l_Pf)RE).D




for K < (Rl)~(l~P~).RE).D
Thus, once capital falls below (RD~(l~Pf).RE).D, reducing capital increases the
expected profit.
A large number of banks compete for deposits. Initially, every bank
pledges Y units of goods as capital. After taking deposits, banks can adjust,
i.e., lower, their capital ratios. Depositors infer whether or not a bank
lowered its capital ratio below the one required to pay off depositors in the bad
state from a noisy indicator. Depositors move their funds from banks judged to
have lowered their capital ratios (risky banks) to banks perceived to have enough
capital (safe banks). This selection process, banks’ selection of capital ratios
and depositors’ selection of banks, is completed before banks lend to
entrepreneurs. This assumption is made to avoid the analysis of bank runs and
liquidation costs, which are not focuses of this paper. The probability that a
bank is perceived to be risky is a decreasing function of the ratio of capital
to deposits. Banks maximize the expected profit by selecting the optimal capital
ratio. From E6,
E(ir) = Pr0 + (l”Pr)(la)Pb”(l - (l~Pf).(l_Pb.Pf)).RD.D (E7)
12where ~r = the probability that a bank is perceived to be risky. Since ai sa
multiple of the capital ratio, P~. is a function of a.
If a bank is perceived risky, the profit is zero because it is forced out of
business. When it is perceived safe by depositors, the expected profit is the
option value.
OE(ir)/OK = ((8Pr/3~~)(lc~’~) - (lPr)(8a/8K)Pb(l - (l~Pf).(l~Pb.Pf)).RD.D
The profit maximizing condition is:
(8Pr/8a) = (i’Pr)/(la)
Let the probability be a simple function of a:
/3.(l-a) if ~ l/(l-a)
1~r=
1 if ~ > l/(l-a)
where ~ is a positive constant determined by the quality of information available
to depositors. The quality of information, ~3,is known to depositors.
In this case, the profit maximizing condition is:
0 if~<l/2
(2~3-l)/2/3 if /3 1/2
The optimum a increases with ~3. Thus, a larger value of ~3 indicate that
depositors have more accurate information and, hence, better monitoring ability
of depositors.
Depositors, who are rational, take this maximizing behavior into their
consideration. When ai sless than 1, the return on deposits is less than R’3 in
the bad state. Then a deposit contract offering RD = 1i snot acceptable to
depositors. In this situation, it is necessary for banks to raise the lending
rate. Although banks can increase the contracted rate of return on deposits by
passing on their increased profits to depositors, the increase is not sufficient
to compensate risk-averse depositors. When E(RE) = 1, the combined expected
13return to banks and depositors is 1. Thus, if banks set RD (RD > 1) such that
their expected profits are zero, E(RD) is 1. When a < 1, the variance of return
on deposits is positive because depositors do not fully recover their principal
in the bad state. A contract offering zero expected rate of return and a
positive variance is not acceptable to risk-averse depositors. Therefore,
imperfect monitoring requires higher lending rates.
When savers estimate a positive probability of bank failure (a < 1), their
maximization problem is similar to the case without the transfer of risks.
E(U5) = Pb•U((l-0)+0•Z) + (1 - Pb).U((l_0)+0.RD) (E8)
where Z = (l~Pf).RE+ a• (Rt)~(l~Pf)•RE), the estimated amount to be recovered per
unit of deposits in the bad state (Z < 1).
As shown above, the maximization of this expected utility with respect to 0 will
produce an upward sloping supply curve of deposits. Then banks can find R’~ [RD
= E(RE) > 1] at which demand equals supply. At this new equilibrium with
monitoring problems, both depositors and bankers are better off at the expense
of entrepreneurs. Depositors benefit from higher return on saving, and bankers
enjoy a positive option value. Imperfect monitoring, however, results in a
deadweight loss. Higher equilibrium return on saving lowers the level of
investment and, hence, production.
More serious monitoring problems (lower /3) and attempts to increase the
option value (lower a) will induce depositors to perceive higher risk of
deposits, which is characterized by a smaller Z. Differentiating E8 with respect
to 0,
3E(u~)/ao = Pb•(3U(Cf)/OCf)•(Z - 1) + (1 - Pb)(~(Cs)/8Cs}(1~~ - 1)
(aE(U~)/.30)/aZ = Pb•(8lJ(Cf)/8Cf) > 0
where Cf = ((l-0)+0.Z), the amount of consumption if the bank fails
14= ((l~0)+0.RD), the amount of consumption if the bank survives.
Thus, holding R’~ constant, 0* is smaller when the deposit contract is riskier
because 8E(U5)/80 is lower at every level of 0. Then the supply curve of saving
becomes steeper. The results are a higher equilibrium return on saving and a
lower level of investment. With a higher risk of deposits, the surpluses to
depositors and bankers depend on the elasticity of demand. In sum, monitoring
problems reduce the effectiveness of financial intermediation in this economy.
2.f. Deposit Insurance
In this economy, deposit insurance backed by the government can improve
social welfare. The government can completely eliminate risks for depositors if





In the bad state, Pf.m investment projects fail. The worst outcome is that
failed projects are the most productive ones. If the return from investment in
the worst case is greater than or equal to the endowment of risk-averse
individuals, transfer through taxation can guarantee the endowment of savers.
Thus, deposit insurance can transfer all risks from depositors to entrepreneurs.
If the above condition is not met, deposit insurance will reduce risks, instead
of eliminating them. In any case, risks for depositors will be minimized when
deposit insurance is provided by the government, which faces least resource
constraints.
With deposit insurance that makes deposits risk-free, the supply of funds
becomes perfectly elastic at the return on saving of 1. Then expected output is
maximized because all investment opportunities are utilized. All economic agents
15benefit from the increase in expected output if an appropriate redistribution
scheme is provided. The government can tax those economic agents who realized
positive return to redistribute income as well as pay off depositors of failed
banks. The tax may be levied such that it does not affect the expected return
and, hence, the investment decision of the marginal entrepreneur.
The expected amount of consumption is the sole determinant of the expected
utility of risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Ignoring taxes for a moment, deposit
insurance increases the expected consumption of entrepreneurs by lowering
borrowing costs for entrepreneurs already in business and enabling more
entrepreneurs to undertake investment. The expected gain in the aggregate
consumption of entrepreneurs with insurance is:
E(GE) = m1~ (l~Pb.Pf).(REN~l).(X~l) + m (E(R3)-l)•X
j=m1+l
where REN = equilibrium borrowing cost with no deposit insurance
= number of profitable projects at RE = REN.
The first term of the above equation, which is the gain from lower borrowing
cost, is a transfer from depositors and bankers to entrepreneurs. The second
term is the increase in production.
To make depositors equally well off, the government does not need to
compensate depositors with the same expected amount that depositors would consume
without insurance to make them equally well off. Since depositors are risk
averse, the certainty equivalent income is smaller than the expected income. In
other words, depositors can be satisfied with a smaller expected amount of
consumption if the government eliminates risks for them. Algebraically, the
transfer to depositors to make them as well off:
TRD < ml~(l-Pb•Pf)(R~-l).(X-l) - E(IIN)
16where
11
N is the aggregate profit of banks with no deposit insurance.
Thus, holding the surplus of bankers constant, the redistribution can make both
savers and entrepreneurs strictly better off.
With deposit insurance, depositors do not monitor banks. If the government
is not as effective as depositors in monitoring banks, a larger portion of
entrepreneurs’ income will be transferred to bankers in the form of higher taxes.
In this model, inferior monitoring ability means a smaller value of /3. The
change in the expected profit of banks is:
E(ir’) - E(ir11) = (l-a(/3’)).Pb.(l - (l-Pf)•(l-Pb~Pf))~R~•D’
- (l-a(/311)).Pb.(l - (l_Pf)(l_Pb.Pf)).R~*DN
= (a(/311)-a(/3’))~Pb•(l - (l-Pf)(l-Pb’Pf))•R~D11
+ (l-a(/3’))•Pb.(l - (l-Pf).(l-Pb•Pf))•(R’~•D1
- R~.DN)
where superscripts I and N denote cases of insurance and no insurance.
If /31< /3N, a(f3’) < a(/311). Thus, banks increase their expected profits by holding
less capital when the government is inferior to depositors in monitoring banks.
Assuming for simplicity that entrepreneurs bear all tax burdens, the bankers’
gain is the entrepreneurs’ loss. However, as long as the increased tax burden
does not exceed the gains from lower borrowing costs and increased investment
[(E(GE) TRD + E(ir’)], entrepreneurs are better off with deposit insurance.
Even if entrepreneurs are worse off due to a substantially inferior ability of
the government to monitor banks, the income transfer among risk-neutral agents
may not significantly affect aggregate utility.
In this model, imperfect monitoring by depositors lowers production, while
imperfect monitoring by the government simply results in income transfer from
entrepreneurs to bankers. Thus, social welfare clearly improves with the
government provision of deposit insurance. Social welfare can deteriorate if
17banks invest in negative net-present-value projects, as well as profitable ones,
to increase the variance of asset returns. Even in that case, welfare may still
improve unless deposit insurance increases investment in more negative than
positive net-present-value projects, that is, unless the government is an
extremely ineffective monitor. Therefore, it is not necessary that the
government monitor banks as effectively as depositors to improve ox ante social
welfare.
3. Conclusion
This paper has shown that the transfer of nondiversifiable risks from risk-
averse savers to other risk-neutral agents increases aggregate investment. The
transfer of risk requires debt contracts offering fixed rates of return and
pledge of capital by financial intermediaries. These conditions are not
sufficient to transfer risk completely if monitoring of financial intermediaries
is less than perfect. A solution to monitoring problems is deposit insurance
backed by the government. Imperfect monitoring by the government mainly results
in income transfer rather than lower production. Thus, deposit insurance can
improve welfare even if the monitoring ability of the government is somewhat
inferior to that of depositors.
The above argument suggests a unique value of traditional banks that offer
deposits backed by the government and make risky loans. Although other financial
institutions successfully perform many traditional functions of banks such as
liquidity provision, information production, and diversification of risks, they
do not effectively transfer nondiversifiable risks from risk-averse agents to
risk-neutral ones. Thus, assuming that the economy is composed of individuals
with different attitudes toward risk, other intermediaries may not fully satisfy
the needs of highly risk-averse agents. In this regard, banks and deposit
18insurance make a unique contribution to economic well-being.
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